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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. EDWARD WESLEY 
BROWN, Appellant. 
[1] Kidnaping-For Purpose of Extonion or Bobbe1'7.-To eon-
stitute kidnaping for the purpose of extortion or robbery, as 
defined by Pen. Code, § 209, it is Dot neceuary that the kid-
naper intend to commit extortion or robbery at the time of 
the original seizure or carrying away. It is sufllcient if the 
extortion or robbery is eommitted during the eourse of the 
abduction. 
[2] Id.-For Purpose of Bobbe1'7.-The acts of. man in forcing' 
a woman to drive her automobile to • eertain destination and 
to walk up a hill where. while she was forcibly detained, he 
raped and robbed her, constitute kidnaping for the purpose 
of robbery, within Pen. Code. § 209. 
[3] Id. - Instructions. - In a prosecution for kidnaping for the 
purpose of robbery, an instruction designating the mime as 
kidnaping as referred to in the information was not subject 
to the objection that it was confusing and erroneous where 
previous instrnctions had denif'd the mime in the language of 
Pen. Code, § 209, and wherf' the court. in a subsequent instrue-
tion as to the form of verdict, referred to the erime as kid-
naping for the purpose of robbery and the jury used those 
words in the verdict. 
[41 Id.-Evidence.-In a prosecution for kidnaping for the pur-
pose of robbery in which the jury fixed the punishment at 
death, the evidence supported a finding that the prosecutrix 
sutTered bodily harm where it showed that she was raped by 
defendant and that he also knocked her to the ground with a 
blow to her chin. (Disapproving People v. Mcnf)tlifl, 55 Cal. 
App.2d 322. 332. 130 P.2d 131.) 
APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento 
County. Da1 M. Lemmon, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution for robbery, rape, and kidnaping for the 
purpose of robbery. Judgment of conviction imposing dcath 
penalty, affirmed. 
fl] See 13 Cal.Jur. 558. 
McK. Dig. References: [I, 2] Kidnapin:, 12; [3] Kidnapinl:. 
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DJ-.rold D. DeCoe and C. K. Curtright for Appellant. 
Robert W. Kenny and Fred N. Howser, Attorneys Gen-
eral, and James O. Reavis, Deputy Attorney General, for 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant, Edward Wesley Brown, was 
convicted of robbery in two counts, of rape, and of kidnap-
ing for the purpose of robbery. The jury found that the 
victim suJfered bodily harm and fixed the punishment at 
death. This is an automatic appeal under section 1299 (b) 
of the Penal Code. 
The facts disclosed by the record are as follows: On March 
22, 1946, at about 9 p. m., Mrs. Cleda 1I. Jacobs returned to 
her automobile after visiting a doctor's office in the city of 
Sacramento. AB soon as she was seated, a man, identified by 
her as defendant, entered the automobile and exhibited a gun. 
saying, "Madam, this is a gun, it is loaded. Do as you are 
told and no harm will come to you." Defendant ordered Mrs. 
Jacobs to drive her ear according to his directions and they 
went an undetermined distance to a point outside the con-
gested area of the city. During the entire ride defendant 
gave the orders and kept his gun pointed at Mrs. Jacobs. 
Finally, he ordered her to drive the ear to the side of the 
road and get out. She started to take her purse with her. 
but was ordered to leave it in the ear. Defendant then got 
out and, still pointing the gun at Mrs. Jacobs, directed her 
to go up a hill on a levee. When they reached some bushes 
defendant ordered Mrs. Jacobs to disrobe and lie down. 
Defendant then had sexual intercourse with her and kept 
the gun in his hand during the entire act. Defendant dried 
himself with a handkerchief, threw it on the ground, and 
ordered ?tIrs. Jacobs to dress. 
After Mrs. Jacobs had dressed, defendant asked her how 
much money was in her purse. She told him that the purse 
contained about a dollar and a half or a dollar and seventy-
five cents. Defendant asked her the question again, threaten-
ingly, and when she gave the same reply he struck her on the 
chin with his fist. Mrs. Jacobs fell to the ground and defend-
ant removed her wrist watch from her arm and left the scene. 
Mrs. Jacobs remained on the ground for a few minutes in a 
dazed condition and heard a motor start. She returned to the 
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living in a tent nearby transported her to town where she 
made a t'eport to the police. At that time she was dis-
traught and her jaw was badly bruised. 
Defendant, meanwhile, t'eturned to town. He met an ac. 
complice, not a party to this appeal, and together they used 
Mrs. Jacob's automobile to follow an automobile driven by 
Mrs. Elsie F. Phelps. Mrs. Phelps noticed the pnrsuing ear 
and drove to the side of the stt'eet, slowing down, to allow it 
to pass. Defendant passed Mrs. Phelps and drove diagonally 
in front of her ear and stopped, thus compelling her to atop. 
Defendant walked over to Mrs. Phelps and told her that she 
had been driving too fast, and when she disagTeed with him 
he opened her ear door and told her to move over. Mrs. Phelps I 
refused and defendant held a gun against her stomach, reached 
across her body and t'emoved her purse, which was on the seat 
to her right. This purse contained a pencil, personal items, 
eight dollars, a billfold and a coin purse. Defendant re-
turned to Mrs. Jacob's automobile and drove away, but Mrs. 
Phelps meanwhile ascertained the lieense number. 
Defendant returned to hits place of residence at about 10 
p. m. after parking Mrs. Jacob's ear about a block and a 
half away. Soon after, the police arrived and made inquiries 
of the owner concerning a person of his description. They 
did not search the place, and defendant remained in a back 
room out of sight. He went to Oakland or San Franeisco at 
about midnight with friends. Two days later he sold his gun 
and Mrs. Jacob's wrist watch to a woman in San Francisco 
and on March 25,1946, he was arrested in that city. A search 
of his person t'eBUlted in the recovery of Mrs. Phelps's pencil 
He was wearing a jacket described and recognized by both 
Mrs. Phelps and Mrs. Jacobs. 
Defendant made a voluntary unsigned and unsworn state-
ment in the presence of police officers and t'epresentatives of 
the district attorney's office. This statement was taken down 
by a stenographer and then transcribed. Defendant admitted 
therein substantially all the facts described above, but could 
not recall striking Mrs. Jacobs with his fist. Be attributed 
his conduct to drinking and to smoking marihuana cigat'ettes, 
although he admitted that at the time of the commission of 
the charged offenses he knew that his conduct was wrongful. 
Defendant was clearly identified as the person who sold the 
gun and wrist watch in San Francisco. Mrs. Jacobs identified 
him as her attacker by selecting him from a lToup of men. 
) 
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Mrs. Phelps identified him by his walk and his features. Mrs. 
Jacobs's testimony was strengthened by the recovery of the 
handkerchief, which proved to contain spermatazoa upon 
laboratory examination. Doctors and witnesses testified to 
the bruise on her left jaw and a photograph taken on March 
27, 1946, showed that her jaw was still discolored. 
The controlling question on this appeal is whether the 
acts of defendant constituted kidnaping for the purpose of 
robbery as defined in section 209 of the Penal Code [1] Sec-
tion 209 is eoneerned with one of the most serious types of 
kidnaping, the spiriting away of individuals for the purpose 
.)1. 
of extortion, robbery or ransom, and authorizes the jury to 
impose the death penalty if the vietim BU1fers bodily harm. 
Section 209 as amended in 1933 provides: 
"Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entiees, de-
coys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any indi-
vidual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or detain, 
or who hold~ or detains, sueh individual for ransom, reward 
or to commit extortion or robbery or to exact from rela-
tives or friends of such person any money or valuable thing, 
or who aids or abets any such aet, is guilty of a felony and upon 
conviction thereof shall BU1fer death or shall be punished bYj 
imprisonment in the State prison for life without possibility of I: 
parole, at the discretion of the jury trying the same, in eases I 
in which the person or persons subjected to such kidnaping . ' .... 1 
BU1fers or BU1fer bodily harm or shall be punished by imprison-
ment in the State prison for life with possibility of parole in 'I 
eases where such person or persons do not BU1fer bodily harm." il 
This section makes it unnecessary to determine whether the ~ A 
kidnaper intended to commit extortion or robbery at the time" 
of the original seizure or carrying away. It is sufficient if the 
extortion or robbery was eommitted during the course of 
the abduction. Thus, whatever may have been the origi-
nal motive of the kidnaping, if the kidnaper commits ex-
tortion or robbery during the kidnaping, he "holds or detains" 
his victim "to commit extortion or robbery" within the mean-
ing of section 209. 
[2] The evidence shows without conflict that defendant 
forced Mrs. Jacobs to drive her automobile to a destination 
selected by him and upon arrival to walk up a hill where she 
was forcibly detained while defendant raped and robbed her. 
While Mrs. Jacobs lay on the ground after the defendant 
struck her, and therefore while the kidnaping was still con-
.. ; 
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. tinuing, he robbed her of her purse, wrist watch, and auto-
mobile. These acts clearly constituted kidnaping for the pur-
pose of robbery as that crime is defined in Penal Code seetion 
209. (Peop'" v. Tcmner, 3 Cal.2d 279, 296 [44 P.2d 324].) 
[3] The trial court, in instructing the jury on the nature 
of the penalties for the crime, referred to the crime as "Kid-
naping, as it has been defined to you," "Kidnaping as 
charged in Count Three of the Information" and "Kidnap-
ing as charged in the Information." The crime had been 
previously defined, in the instructions, as follows: 
"Section 209 of the Penal Code of the State of Califor-
nia provides 80 far as pertinent, as follows: 
" 'Every person who seizes, confines, inveigles, entices, de-
coys, abducts, conceals, kidnaps or carries away any indi-
vidual by any means whatsoever with intent to hold or de-
tain, or who holds or detains such individual, to commit 
robbery is guilty of the crime of kidnaping." 
Defendant contends that the jury could not reasonably be 
expected to remember the charges contained in the wonna-
tion, that the crimt' defined by the trial court was not kidnap-
ing, but kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and that, there-
fore, the jury was not informed as to the oft'ense for which it 
prescribed the death penalty. Even if the jury did not re-
member the wow of the information, the trial court cor-
rectly defined the offense charged, namely, kidnaping for the 
purpose of robbery. It is immaterial that the crime was desig-
nated simply as "kidnaping" rather than "kidnaping for 
the purpose of robbery" since the latter is kidnaping within 
the meaning of section 209 (People v. Tanner, supra, at p. 296) 
and the instruction was concerned only with that type of 
kidnaping. Section 209 itself, after defining the particular 
offense in detail, describes it as "kidnaping." The trial 
court later, when instructing the jury as to the form of its 
verdict, referred to the erime as "Kidnaping for the Pur-
pose of Robbery" and the jury used those words in its verdict. 
The jury was adequately informed of the nature of the crime 
with which defendant was charged and the instructions were 
neither confusing nor erroneous. 
[4] The finding of the jury that Mrs. Jacobs suffered 
bodily harm is clearly supported by the evidence. "Bodily 
M1'tn is generally defined as 'any touching of the person of 
another against his will with physical force in an intentional, 
hostile and aggravated manner, or projecting of such force 
, 
i 
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against his person.'" (People v. TcmMr, "'pro, at p. 297.) 
The forcible rape itself was bodily harm. AIly statement to the 
contrary in People v. McIlf}oin, 55 Cal.App.2d 322, 332 [130 
P.2d 131] is disapproved. In addition to the rape defendant 
knocked Mrs. Jacobs to the ground with a vicious blow to her 
chin, which remained bruised and discolored for aeveral days. 
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a 
new trial are aflirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J.t Edmonds, J .. Carter, J .. Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J .. eoncurred. 
